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JOHN E. DONALDSON 
Law Reform-Suggested Revisions to 
Virginia's Wills Statutes 
Part Two 
PART One of this article, which was published in 
the spring, 198:1 issue of The Virginia Bar Journal, 
noted that the Executive Committee of The Virginia 
Bar Association has requested the Committee on 
Wills, Trusts and Estates to undertake a study of Vir-
ginia law relating to succession to property and 
administration of estates. The Committee, in its work 
to date, has examined the adequacy of Virginia law in 
anum ber of areas and has carefully considered statu-
tory approaches employed in other states, including 
those which have adopted the Uniform Probate Code. 
The Committee's efforts thus far have contributed to 
the enactment of a number of statutory changes over 
the last several years. 
The first installment of this article discussed sev-
eral proposed revisions to Virginia's wills statutes 
which are under consideration by the Committee on 
Wills, Trusts and Estates. The remaining proposals 
currently under active consideration are presented in 
this segment, which, like the first, is intended to 
inform the har of proposed changes and to invite 
comments and suggestions. The Committee hopes to 
report its recommendations to the Executive Commit-
tee prior to the 1984 session of the General Assembly. 
D. Effect of Marriage of Testator 
after Execution of Will 
Because of recent changes in the intestate succes-
sion statutes, ~ 64.1-1 and ~ 64.1-11, additional statu-
tory changes are needed to better implement the pre-
sumed intent of a testator who executes a will and 
subsequently marries. Virginia law, set forth in S 04.1-
58, provides that neither the subsequent marriage of a 
testator nor birth of a child to a testator, or hoth, shall 
operate to revoke a will previously executed by the 
testator. Although the marriage of a testator does not 
revoke his will, the renunciation statutes provide 
relief to a surviving spouse aggrieved by the provi-
sions of the will. 
The inadequacy of Virginia law may be illustrated 
by the following examples: Suppose that a hachelor 
executes a will leaving his entire estate to his brother, 
and that he subsequently marries, and fails, for what-
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ever reason, to execute a new will pnor to death. 
Under current law, if there are no children, the surviv-
ing spouse may renounce the will and pursuant to 
§ 64.1-16 claim one-half of the net personalty, and 
pursuant to ~ 64.1-19, claim one-third ofthe realty as 
dower. Brother will get the residue. Suppose, however, 
that there is a child born of the marriage. The results 
differ. Where the testator is survived by both his 
spouse and child, the spouse's share upon repudia-
tion drops from one-half to one-third of the net per-
sonalty and the spouse remains entitled to one-third 
of the realty as dower. Brother again gets the residue, 
which is larger than it would have been had there 
been no afterborn child. The child gets nothing, not-
withstanding that he is seemingly a "pretermitted 
heir." Under § 64.1-70 the child's share as a "preter-
mitted heir" is exactly zero because of the effect of 
1982 amendments to S 04.1-\ and ~ 61.1-11. Section 
64.1·70 purports to give the "pretermitted heir" the 
share that he would have taken had the decedent died 
intestate. However, by reason of the 19f12 amend-
ments, if the decedent had died intestate, his surviv-
ing spouse, being a parent of all of his issue, would 
have succeeded to the entire estate. Suppose further, 
however, that after the marriage and birth of the 
child, the testator's spouse dies or divorce occurs, and 
testator dies survived by the child. Here, notwith-
standing the will provision leaving everything to 
brother, hrother gets nothing and child gets the entire 
estate by force of§ 64.1·70, the entire estate heing the 
child's intestate portion in such circumstance. 
The divergent results that flow from current stat-
utes cannot be defended on policy grounds. Such 
results are unintended consequences of the 1982 
amendments to ~ 64.1-1 and § 64.1-11. Sounder results 
would obtain if Virginia fol lowed a rule which treated 
the "pretermitted spouse" as being entitled to an 
intestate portion. Where there are no children or 
where the surviving spouse is the parent of all of the 
testator's children, the intestate portion of the surviv-
ing spouse would be the entire estate. Where the sur-
viving spouse is not the parent of all the decedent's 
children, the intestate portion would be one-third of 
the net personalty plus one-third of the realty as 
dower. The Uniform Probate Code at ~ 2-:101 provides 
an intestate portion to the surviving spouse who mar-
ried the testator after the execution of his will. 
Legislative proposal.') adds new section 64.1-69. 1. It 
is set forth in the Appendix and borrows heavily from 
the U.P.C. 
E. Effect of Divorce on a Will; 
Other Changes of Circumstances 
Where a testator becomes divorced a vinculo matri-
monii aft!:'r th!:' execution of a will, all provisions in 
the will in favor of the divorced spouse are thereby 
revoked, but not the will itself, by force of § 64.1-59. 
This statute does not address the possibility that the 
testator may subsequently remarry the divorced 
spouse. A number of other states, including those 
which have adopted U.P.C. S 2-50R, anticipate this 
event and provide that upon remarriage to the 
divorced spouse the testator's will, if otherwise in 
effect, is automatically revived. 
Leg-islativ!:' proposal 6, set forth in the Appendix, 
amends § 64.1.')9. In addition to following the 
approach of the u.P.c. set forth above, the draft legis-
lation shifts from ~ 6·1.1-5R to § 54.I-fi9 the rule that 
the subsequ!:'nt marriage of a testator or birth of a 
child to him does not operate to revoke a will. This 
rule is better set forth in a "change of status" type of 
statute than in a "revocation generally" type of stat-
ute. Also, the revised statute codifies the rule in Jones 
v. Bro/I'll, 21~) Va. 599, 24R S.E.2d 812 (1978) that, for 
purpos!:'s of construction, a divorced spouse is treated 
as having pr!:'d!:'C'!:'ased the testator. 
F. Specific Bequests and Devises of 
Encumbered Property 
Virginia follows a common law rule that all debts 
for which the testator is personally liable, including a 
debt secured by property that is the subject of a spe-
cific devise or bequest, are to be paid from personalty 
in the resid ue. Sec Owen v. Lee, lRf> Va. 160, :37 S.E.2d 
84R (1946). The legatee or devisee th us possesses a 
right to exoneration, that is , the right to require the 
executor to payoff the encumbrance. Under U.P.C. § 
2-609 the common law rule is reversed and the 
encumbered property passes to the legatee or devisee 
subject to the encumbrance. 
The U.P.C. approach, with modifications, is prefer-
able. The best rule to follow is one that implements 
the intention of the hypothetical "typical" testator. 
Experience reveals that testators, when interviewed 
by attorneys preparing their wills and questioned 
regarding their wishes as to encumbered property 
that is the subject of sp!:'cific devises and bequest.", 
~I 
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usually express a preference that the legatee or de-
visee take the property with the burden of the encum-
brance. They generally do not wish their executors to 
be under a duty to payoff encumbrances during the 
period of administration. 
Although the U.P.C. does not make it, an important 
distinction can be drawn between encumbered land 
and tangible personalty, on the one hand, and 
encumbered intangibles such as stocks and bonds on 
the other. Debts secured by land and tangible person-
alty are usually incurred in connection with the 
acquisition of, or an improvement to, the property and 
are generally payable in installments over a period of 
years. Hence, in the mind (lfthe "typical" testator, the 
debt secured by real estate or tangible property is 
closely associated with the property. He is more likely 
to regard a specific bequest or devise of such property 
as embracing only his "equity" in the property. How-
11 
ever, where a debt is secured by stocks or bonds it is 
less likely that the deht was incurred in connection 
with the acquisition of the particular securities. Often 
stocks and bonds are pledged as security for lines of 
credit or other forms of short-term borrO\",ing. A testa-
tor, having executed a will that specifically hequeaths 
his securities to a particular legatee, prohably docs 
not intend, when he pledges tht: securities as collat-
eral for a loan, to impair the value of the legacy in the 
event that he dies before the loan is repaid. 
Legislative proposal 7, which would add new § 64.1-
62.2, is set forth in the Appendix. The draft follows 
the approach of the U.P.C. as to realty and tangible 
personalty, but not as to intangihles, and draws upon 
features of applicahle New York law. 
G. Exercise of Power of Appointment; 
Effect of Residuary Clause 
Virginia law respecting the circumstances under 
which a will is regarded as exercising a power of 
appointment possessed by a testator is not adequate. 
Section 64.1-67 requires that a will, otherwise silent 
on the testator's intention to exercise a general power 
of appointment, be construed as if its dispositive pro-
visions em braced the appoin ti ve property. Thus, a 
residuary clause is construed as exercising such a 
power of appointment. See Machir v. Funk. 99 Va. 284, 
18 S.E.2d 197 (189:3). It is unclear whether a special 
power of appointment is exercised by a residuary 
clause. See Note, 47 Va. L. Rev. 711 (1961). If, how-
ever, the instrument creating the power requires that 
specific reference be made to the power before it can 
be exercised, the requirement will be given effect. See 
Ho/tzhach v. United Va. Bank, 216 Va. 482, 219 
S.E.:ld 868 (I mfi). 
The use of powers of appointment in estate plan-
ning has changed significantly since 1948, when the 
estate tax marital deduction first became available. 
The most frequent usc of the general power of 
appointment today occurs in connection with marital 
deduction trusts. A typical decedent who gives his 
spouse general appointive power over the corpus of a 
trust is more likely to be motivated by the tax advan-
tage than by the likelihood that his spouse will 
exercise control over the devolution of his property. 
He typically anticipates the non-exercise of the power 
by designating takers in default of appointment and 
more often than not requires a specific reference to the 
power be made in the instrument exercising the power 
for the exercise to be effective. 
A majority of American jurisdictions have rejected 
the Virginia approach and resolve the policy issue hy 
deferring to the presumed intent of the donor of the 
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power. The U . P.c. at S ~-o 1 () is typical of the majority 
position in requiring a will to make specific reference 
to a power of appointment to exercise the power. The 
majority position is thus one of implementing a pre-
sumption that the donor of a power of appointment 
would prefer the appointive property to pass under 
the terms of his trust instrument or will except where 
the donee has affirmatively manifested an intent to 
exercise the power. Because such a presumption is 
correct in most cases, the approach of the u.P.C. 
is preferred. 
Legislative proposal 8, patterned on the U .P.C., 
amends ~ 61.1-67 and is set forth in the Appendix. It 
applies to both special and general powers of ap-
pointment. 
H. Ademption by Satisfaction 
Where a testator makes provision in his will for a 
legatee, and thereafter makes gifts to the legatee, it is 
possible that he intends the gifts to be in reduction of 
the legacy and also possible that he intends the gifts 
to be additional bounty. Virginia, at ~ 64.1-6:~ , pro-
vides that a provision for or advancement to a devisee 
or legatee is in satisfaction of a devise or beq uest if it 
appears from parol or other evidence to have been so 
intended. Presumably, in the absence of evidence of 
intent, a gift to a legatee is not in reduction of the 
legacy. 
The Virginia statute is deficient in several respects. 
It does not address the quality of the evidence 
required, nor the burden of proof. Is the evidence to be 
"dear and convincing?" The term "other evidence" is 
vague. For example, does the fact that the value of 
gifts made to the legatee is substantial in relation to 
the amount of the legacy constitute evidence that the 
gifts are intended to be in reduction of the legacy? 
Also, the statute, in permitting the lise of parol evi-
dence, invites the use of the most unreliable kinds of 
testimony. If a will provides a legacy to son of $2;'),000 
with the residue to daughter, and testator gave son 
$1 :\()()O after executing thl' will, daughter apparently 
is permitted to testify self-servingly that testator pri-
vately told her that the gifts to son were intended as 
reductions in his legacy. Because in the usual case a 
testator making a gift to a legatee intends additional 
hounty, reliable evidence should be required if that 
intent is not to be presumed. 
The approach of the U.P.c. at ~ 2-1112 is preferred. 
That section imposes high evidentiary requirements 
in providing that a gift to a legatee does not reduce a 
legacy unless the will so provides. or unless declared 
by the testator in a contl'mporary writing or unless 
the legatee acknowledges in writing that the gift is in 
satisfaction of the legacy. 
Legislative proposal 9, which amends ~ 64.1-63, is 
set forth in the Appendix. 
L Construction of Certain Legacies and 
Devises; Non-Ademption in Certain Cases 
After the execution of a will, and prior to the death 
of a testator, property that is the subject of a specific 
bequest or devise may be transformed, altered or 
enlargpcl, often without affirmative action by the 
testator. In addition, such property may cease to exist 
or may be disposed of without affirmative action by 
him. Of course, where the testator voluntarily con-
veys property that is subject to a specific bequest, the 
conveyance effects an ademption of the property by 
extinction and the legacy is in effect revoked. Should 
a legacy he revoked, however, when it is described as 
ten shares of stock of a particular corporation, and 
the corporation changes its name, or where, by reason 
of a reorganization, the corporation is ahsorbed in a 
larger company and the ten shares have been sur-
rendered and replaced by stock of the acquiring cor-
poration? If there is a hvo for one stock split, should 
the legacy be construed as embracing twenty shares? 
What result should obtain if, after executing his will, 
the testator becomes incompetent and the shares are 
sold by his committee? 
The common law developed a "mere change in 
form" doctrine which has been applied to save many 
of these troublesome legacies. The trend of recent 
decisions has heen enlargement of the doctrine. 
Although the few decisions applying the doctrine in 
Virginia are sound, the case law in this state is not 
sufficiently extensive to adequately resolve a number 
of issues. Other than ~ 8,01-77, which, by giving the 
devisee the proceeds, prevents ademption where lands 
of a person under a disability, but competent at the 
execution of his will, are sold pursuant to a judicial 
sale, there is no statutory law on the subject. On 
ademption generally, see G. SMITH, HARRISON ON 
WILLS Af'.'D ADMINISTRATION (2d Ed.) ~§ a~)7. 
40'2. 
Because the case law is not sufficiently developed, 
legislative treatment of the problem is needed. The 
U.P.C. at ~ 2-G07 and § Z-608 seeks to implement the 
presumed intent of a testator in a number of situa-
tions involving transformation, alteration and enlarge-
ment of the subject property , and the destruction or 
involuntary disposition of property. In so doing it 
requires that the legacy be construed as embracing 
the transformed or enlarged property, certain insur-
ance proceeds, and proceeds from certain sales. The 
approach of the u.P.C. is sound except where it 
includes in a legacy of stock additional mutual fund 
shares acquired pursuant to a plan of reinvestment 
and where it embraces the proceeds unpaid at death 
when the testator has voluntarily sold the property 
which is the subject of the specific bequest or devise. 
Legislative proposal 10, which, drawing from the 
U.P.C. , adds 64.1-62.1, is set forth in the Appendix. 
J. Testamentary Additions to Trusts 
Having Non-Resident Trustees 
In 1979 the American College of Probate Counsel 
released a study which found that in thrity-nine 
states and the District of Columbia there are no sig-
nificant limitations on the use of non-resident trus-
tees in connection with testamentary pour-overs. A 
1982 study by that organization also found that the 
majority of jurisdictions impose no substantial re-
strictions on the use of non-residen t fiduciaries as 
executors, guardians or testamentary trustees. How-
ever, by § '26-59 and ~ 64.1-7:i Virginia prohibits, in the 
case of corporations, and severely restricts, in the 
case of individuals, the use of non-resident fiduciaries. 
The Committee on Wills, Trusts and Estates is con-
sidering the general matter of restrictions on the use 
of such fiduciaries. However, in the discussion that 
follows, the focus is on restrictions applicable to test-
amentary additions to established trusts that have 
non-resident trustees. Different policy considerations 
may be in volved in the questions of whether non-resi-
dent individuals or corporations can properly serve as 
executors, administrators, guardians, committees, etc. 
Section 64.1-73(a)(:i) prohibits a testamentary pour-
over to an established trust unless at least one trustee 
is a resident individual or is a corporation authorized 
to do a trust business in this state, and provided that 
the trust has no corporate trustee not so authorized. 
However, ~ 64.1-7:i(h) provides that a pour-over to a 
disqualified trust is not to fail, but a proper trustee is 
to be appointed. These restrictions on use of non-
resident trustees appear to serve no useful purpose 
other than that of aiding the Virginia financial com-
munity. This aid comes at the expense of frustrating 
the decedent's choice of trustees. Such frustration of a 
decedent's choice requires a compelling reason, which 
is lacking. The policy of Virginia's legislation on wills 
should be to implement, ~herever possible, the dece-
dent's validly expressed testamentary wishes. If a 
testator estabhshes a lifetime trust for a child, with 
testator's brother as trustee, and brother moves from 
Virginia to Maryland and is a Maryland resident at 
testator's death , there is no sound reason why a pour-
over legacy to brother, as trustee, should not be per-
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mitted. Seemingly, § 64.1-73(h) will require a Virginia 
court to appoint a Virginia trustee to administer the 
pour-over amount as a separate trust, thus causing 
the existence of two identical trusts for the same 
beneficiary. 
Other problems are created by § 64.1-73(a)(3). For 
example, a Virginia testator may wish to make a split 
interest gift to Duke University (income to son for life, 
remainder to charity) and choose the device of a 
legacy to the Duke University Pooled Income Fund in 
the expectation of enjoying an estate tax charitable 
deduction for the value of the remainder interest. 
Under the Virginia statute, ifthe trustees ofthe Fund 
are non-residents, they are prohibited from receiving 
the testamentary pour-over. The curative provisions 
of 64.1-73(h), even in the light of 26-64 et seq., which 
permit court ordered transfers to non-resident trustees 
in certain cases, may be inadequate to salvage the 
charitable deduction. See I.R.C. § 2055(e)(2)(A) and 
Treas. Reg. 1.642(c)-5(b)(5). The regulation provisions 
defining a qualified "pooled income fund" require 
that the charity have power to replace or remove the 
trustee or trustees, a power not contemplated in 
64.1-73(h). 
It may be argued that there are two reasons for 
requiring at least one "pour-over" trustee to be a resi-
dent or a corporation authorized to do business in this 
state. These are (1) to assure a Virginia forum for the 
enforcement ofthe trustee's fiduciary duties and (2) to 
assure the existence of a potential defendant trustee 
who is likely to have assets subject to writ of execu-
tion in this state. However, these reasons do not 
explain the absolute prohibition contained in § 64.1-
73(a)(3) against having as one of several trustees a 
trustee that is a corporation not authorized to do bus-
iness in this state. In any event, if these are the rea-
sons for the current state of Virginia law, they are not 
sufficiently compelling to justify the frustration of 
freedom of testation resulting from the application of 
the statute. 
Presumably, a testator who creates during his life-
time, and while a resident of Indiana, a trust with an 
Indiana trustee and executes a will providing a test-
amentary pour-over to the trust is content in the 
knowledge that the beneficiaries of the trust will gen-
erally have to look to Indiana courts to prevent a 
breach of fiduciary duty. Should he become a domici-
lary of Virginia and die with the same arrangements 
in effect, he presumably remains content in that 
knowledge. The testator having chosen to use an 
Indiana trust as the vehicle to implement his disposi-
tive scheme, thus subjecting the interests of the trust 
beneficiaries to the protection of Indiana courts and 
law, why should Virginia not be content with the pro-
14 
tections afforded to the be:1eficiaries by the courts 
and law of Indiana? Is the focal point of Virginia 
policy the fact that the testator, at time of death was a 
domiciliary of Virginia? Apparently not! If the trust 
has no beneficiaries who are Virginia Residents, § 64.1-
73(h) and § 26-64 et seq. permit, through a somewhat 
cumbersome procedure, the amounts to be transferred 
to a non-resident trustee. It thus appears that the 
primary focal point of the policy of Virginia law in 
requiring at least one resident trustee for testamen-
tary pour-overs is not the domiciliary status of the 
testator, but the present existence of one or more Vir-
ginia residents as beneficiaries of the trust. 
Assuming, however, it to be valid policy for Vir-
ginia to assure to resident beneficiaries of trusts 
receiving testamentary pour-overs the availability of 
a Virginia forum, this policy could be furthered by a 
bonding requirement in the non-resident trustee situ-
ation pursuant to which the surety on the bond con-
sents to in personam jurisdiction in Virginia. The 
implementation of such policy through the device of 
requiring at least one trustee to be a resident and pro-
hibiting altogether non-resident corporate trustees 
which are not authorized to do business in this state is 
overly restrictive and unduly harsh. 
However, the imposition of a "bonding" require-
ment is not recommended. The apparent Virginia pol-
icy of assuring to Virginia residents who are bene-
ficiaries of trusts receiving testamentary pour-overs 
access to Virginia courts to remedy breaches of fidu-
ciary duty is unsound. Virginia can properly assume 
that the courts and law of the state of residence of 
non-Virginia trustees will adequately remedy any 
breach of fiduciary duty that may occur. The conven-
ience afforded by a Virginia forum does not offset the 
stronger policy of promoting freedom of testation. 
Due regard should be given to the wishes of the testa-
tor. One's freedom of testation should not be com-
promised merely because assets intended to pour-over 
into an existing trust are located in a state of which 
the trustee is not a resident. 
The fact that § 64.1-73 contemplates the appoint-
ment of a substitute trustee when the "resident trus-
tee" proviso is violated is not sufficiently curative. 
The non-resident trustee of the existing trust as to 
which the pour-over amount is intended to flow may 
be a family member of the settlor-testator who is 
related to the beneficiary class and has special 
knowledge of family circumstances and interests. He 
may have been selected by the settlor-testator because 
of such knowledge and relationships and given very 
broad discretion to act by reason of those qualities. In 
such circumstances a substitute trustee appointed 
pursuant to § 64.1-73(h) would likely be a very poor 
substituw for the trustee selected by the settlor-testa-
tor. Strong considerations of policy and state interest 
are required to justify rejection of a trustee selected by 
the settlor-testator. Rejection soley because of non-resi-
dence is not such a consideration . 
Legislative proposalll, which amends ~ 64.1-n, is 
set forth in the Appendix. 
K. Pour-Over Trusts; Effect of Remainderman 
Predeceasing Testator 
The Virginia anti-lapse statute, ~ 64.1-64, is defi-
cient in its application to beneficiaries of trusts which 
receive testamentary pour-overs. This particular defi-
ciency arises from a 1980 amendment that applies the 
section to "the interest passing upon a termination of 
a testamentary trust or of an inter vivos trust which 
receives a devise or bequest such as contemplated in 
§ 64.1 -73" (testamentary additions to trusts). As ap-
plied to remaindermen under testamentary trusts, the 
amendment seems unnecessary. See Hester v. Sam-
mons, 171 Va. 142, 198 S.E. 406 (19:38). 
Presumably the "interest passing upon a termina-
tion" is a remainder interest free of trust. If so, con-
sider the following hypothetical: 
Testator, while alive establishes a revoca-
hie trust funded with $100,000, income to 
spouse for life, remainder to brother. Brother 
executes a will leaving his entire estate to 
brother's wife and nothing to son and dies. 
One day after brother's death, testator dies 
having executed a will which leaves a pour-
over amount of $200,000 to the lifetime trust, 
which hecame irrevocable at his death. As-
sume that the trust corpus, as enlarged hy 
the pour-over, is $:300,000 and that testator's 
spouse dies shortly after testator. 
Who takes the remainder in the trust corpus? 
In the absence of a statute, it is probable that the 
$100,000 that initially funded the revocable trust is 
regarded as vested beneficially in the trust beneficiar-
ies subject to defeasance by exercise of the power of 
revocation, and since revocation did not occur during 
the life of the settlor, the $100,000 that initially funded 
the trust would be a descendahle interest which 
passes under brother's will to his wife. See Annota-
tion, Anti-lapse Statute as Applicable to Interest of 
Beneficiary Under Inter Vivos Trust Who Prede-
ceases Lif£>-Tenant Settlor, 47 ALR :1d :158. It is 
unclear whether the 1980 amend men t to ~ 64.1-64, 
which embraces both revocahle and irrevocahle trusts, 
is intended to change that result. What is the mean-
ing of the term "interest" as used in ~ 6·1 .1-64 in the 
phrase "the interest passing upon a termination ... ?" 
Does it refer to the entire amount held in trust, or only 
to that portion of the trust attributable to the testa-
mentary pour-over? It if means the entire interest, 
including the pour-over amount, then the entire 
$300,000 would pass to the brother's son, a result 
inconsistent with the theory that a revocable trust 
creates interests that are vested subject to defeasance 
by revocation. It is that theory, pursuant to which life-
time gifts to revocable trusts are regarded as gifts in 
praesentae, that permits the law to regard the revoc-
able trust as a non-testamentary instrument not 
required to be executed in accordance with the statute 
of wills . Also, if the term "interest" refers to the entire 
corpus as enlarged by the pour-over amount, then an 
unusual result can occur in the context of our ahove 
hypothetical. If brother predeceases testator by one 
day, then under § 64.1-64 brother's son takes the 
entire remainder, but if brother survives the decedent 
by one day brother's wife gets the entire remainder. 
Also, had there been no testamentary pour-over, 
brother's wife would have received $100,000. See 
Annotation, 47 ALR 3d :15R. Why should she be 
deprived of that amount simply because testator 
hequeathed the residue of his estate to the trust? 
Should an anti-lapse statute enacted to implement the 
presumed intent of a testator presume such divergent 
treatment is intended? If, however, the term "interest" 
refers only to that part of the trust attrihutable to the 
pour-over amount, different results ohtain. In our 
hypothetical, if brother predeceases testator by one 
day then under ~ 64. 1-64 brother's wife gets one-third 
of the remainder and brother's son gets two-thirds. 
However, if I ' :lther sur' -' ~s the testator by one day, 
brother's wife gets all. Yet the language from which 
we infer the intent of the testator, the words in the 
trust and the will, are the same in both instances. 
If Virginia's anti-lapse statute were silent on the 
question of application to testamentary pour-overs, 
seemingly the pour-over amount would devolve in 
accordance with § 64.1-73(d)(2) which provides in 
relevant part that the pour-over amount shall "he 
administered and disposed of in accordance with the 
terms of the trust as they appear in writing at the 
testator's death." Presumably, that language is in-
tended simply to enlarge the trust by the pour-over 
amount and to require the trust corpus, so enlarged, to 
be administered in accordance with the terms of the 
trust. Arguably, in our example where brother prede-
ceases testator by one day, the entire corpus, includ-
ing the pour-over amount, would pass in remainder to 
hrother's wife. It is, however, possible that courts 
would hold that in the absence of an anti-lapse statuw 
of the present Virginia variety, the pour-over amount 
passes either under the residuary clause in testator's 
will or by intestacy. 
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The subject language in ~ G4.1-64 is not satisfactory 
for sevl'ral rl'HSons. It is vague, as has already been 
noted . In this regard, it has been suggested that the 
19HO amendment was intended to "save" the re-
mainder in a situation where testator during life gives 
SI()(),()()() in trust, to "A" for life, remainder to HR," 
and life tenant dies while testator is alive followed by 
t1w death of "B," the remainderman, while testator is 
alive. Assuming that testator's will leaves a pour-over 
amount to the lifetime trust, docs the 19HO amend-
ml'nt to ~ fi ,1.I-f.i4 save the pour-over from lapse'! lfit 
was intendf'd to do that, it apparently fails in the 
effort because the amendment is applicable only 
where the lifetime trust receives a pour-over contem-
plated hy ~ fi4.1-7:1 and § 64.1-Tl(f) by its terms permits 
a pour-over only if thf' trust is operative at the testa-
tor's death. The trust is not, however, operative at 
death because it terminated at the earlier death of the 
life-tenant .. The suhject language is also ohjedionable 
because in its application it C(luses unsatisfactorily 
diverg~'nt patterns of distribution of remainder in-
t('n'sts. 
The most satisfactory treatment of the problem is 
obtained by retaining the theory that revocable trusts 
('reatf' presen t in terests su bject to dcf('asance by revo-
cation and by implementing a rule that any pour-over 
addition to a trust should devolve in the manner that 
t.he original corpus of such trust would devolve, as if 
the pour-over amount were added to t.he corpus of the 
trust during the life of the testator-sl'ttior. The present 
requirement nf ~ 54.l -7:)(£') that the trust hf' operative 
at death for a pour-over to be effective should be 
r('tained . 
It is, of course, unnecessary to spell out a statutory 
solution to every conceivable tpstamentary prublem. 
The problems to which the 18HO amendment to ~ 64.1-
0,1 are addressed do not appear to have arisen with 
any frequency , perhaps hecase holographic ,"vilis 
rarely use tlw device of testamentary pour-overs, and 
trusts and wills prepared by atturneys g-enerally 
address the contingencies. which left unaddressed, 
cause tlw problems. If that conclusion is drawn, th(' 
uffending 19HO amendment should he repealed. This 
is accomplishf'd in legislative proposal I at page 2H of 
thl' Spring, I ~)H:l issue of Th(, VirRinia Rar -Journa/. 
If a statutory solution to thl' prohlpm is desired, 
consideration should be given to legislative proposal 
12, set forth in the Appendix, which clarifies ~ 1::i4.1-n. 
L. Formalities of Execution 
Section 64.1-49, in req ui ring for th e d Uf' f'xeCl! tion of 
a non-holographic will that the witnesses subsc:ribe in 
the presence of the testator and that they be present 
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at the same time the testator executl'S the will or 
acknowledges his prior execution, is unnecessarily 
restrictive. Formalities rl'quirl'd in connection with 
will executions are often justified on two broad 
grounds. Th~~se are (1) the formalit.\, of will execution 
imparts a ceremony to t1w act of testation. thereby 
impressing the testator with the spriousness of his act 
and (2) the formalities involving the role of witnesses 
minimize the risks of fraud , collusiun, duress, etc. The 
first g-round appears of limited importance in states 
such as Virginia which permit holog-raphic wills since 
the essencl' of the holographic will is the absc'nce of 
c('remony in its execution. 
The second ground is the sounder, hut inherent in 
requiring formalitil's to pn'vl' nt " fraudulent," etc. 
t('station is that fail ure t.o (Jb~l'rVl' t.he req ui red for-
malities frequently keeps non-fraudulent testamen-
tary writings from being effective as w·ills. Require-
ments intended to prevent "fraud," etc. often , even in 
the ahsence of a sug-g-cstion of fraud, operatp to pre-
vent valid test.ation. Thus, in Virginia, testamf'ntary 
effectiveness has been dl'nied when' the testat.or, after 
signing a will, slipped into unconsciousness hefore 
the witnesses were able to sign in his "conscious pres-
ence." 7l1('ker v. Sandridl-!<' , Hi) Va .. "1'16, H S.E. G,,)O 
(I RRR). Similarly, t('~tation ma.\' hl' denied where there 
is doubt as to whether thl' tI'stator 's signing or 
acknowledgem~'nt occurred in the simultaneous pres-
lmceofboth witnesses. French v.lkl'il/e, 191 Va. R42, 
6~ S . E.~d HH:3 (l~)Gl). C~ivpn the hurdpll of proofon the 
propOlwnt of it \"ill to estahli~h dlw ex('('ut.illn, :1nd the 
dilliculty of proving Yl'ars later that the required 
sequence of events and grouping of persons occurred, 
the Virginia courts han' resorted to presumptions to 
prevent evidentiary prohll'ms from dl'fl'ating testa-
tion. Thus, the subscription of his nanw by a witness 
in a room in which the LPstator is lo('att'd is prima 
facie proof that the signing occurred in the "presence" 
of the testator . • !\lei! v. Npil, ~H Va. Ii (IH~~)). And a 
recitation in an attestation clause is prima facie proof 
thereof in certain in~tan('es . ('/arl<(' v. !JIII/nae 'ant. :n 
Va. 14 (1 H:19). And regularity i~ often presumed where 
the witnesses are dead or suffer a failure of recollec-
tion. '{OUf1R v. Barner, fiR Va. ~)fi (187Ii) (Die/a). 
As is evident. from tlw foregoing , l'al'h formality 
required for a valid will execution presents a potential 
source of litigation as to wheth('r such furmalit.\, was 
in fact obserVl~d and POSI!S a threat that clearly 
express('d non-fraudulent testamentary writings may 
he defeated by oVl'rsight or h.v the will's proponent's 
inability to carry his burden of proof. The U.P.c. at 
§ ~-.')O~ undl'rtukes to prevl'nt "fraud," dc. by requir-
ing only that the testator's signing or acknowledge-
ment be witnessed by two competent persons who 
subscribe their names, notwithstanding that the test-
ator may not sign or acknowledge in the presence of 
two witnesses present at the same time and notwith-
standing that subscription of the will by the wit-
nesses does not occur in the presence of the testator. 
It is submitted that the protection against "fraud," 
etc. in testation afforded by the U.P.C. is entirely ade-
quate and that the Virginia requirements of mldi-
tional formalities are unwarranted, unnecessary, in-
vite litigation and often defeat non-fraudulent testa-
mentary writings. [t is frankly difficult to imagine 
circumstances where fraud, collusion, etc. could occur 
under the U.l'.C. requirements, but would not occur 
under the existing Virginia requirements. Accord-
ingly, it is recommended that the Virginia statute be 
amended to <ielete the unnecessary formalities noted 
above. 
Virginia attorneys should, however, continue to fol-
low established practice::; in will executions. These 
customary practice::;, which are described in the reci-
tations of standard attestation clauses, are designed 
to assure that wills are valid under the laws of all 
states. Also, compliance with the practice of having 
the witnesses present at the same time assures con-
venience of probate, for where witnesses arc so pres-
ent, the testimony of only one witness is adequate to 
establish the fact of due execution. Bruce v. Shuler - . , 
lOR Va. n70, 02 S.E. ~ml (IgOR). 
Holographic wills are allowed in Virginia by § 64.1-
49. That statutI-' requires the will to be "wholly" in the 
handwriting of the testator and requires that fact to 
be proved by two "disinterested" witnesses. The term 
"wholly" is ambiguous, but it probably means the 
"material provisions" must be in the handwriting of 
the testator. See Belt v. Timmins, 190 Va. 648, 58 
S.E.2d 5;j (19f)()) and Gooch v. Gooch 1:14 Va. 21,11:1 
S.E. Rn (l92~). The u.P.c., which, at § 2-fiO:3, also 
permits holographic wills, describes the permitted 
documl'nt as one in which "the material provisions 
are in the handwriting of the testator." necause it is 
less ambiguous, the terminology employed in the 
U.l'.C. is preferred. 
The Virginia r('quin~ment of proof of a holographic 
will hy two "disint~'r('st('d" witm!Sses is unduly restric-
tive. Those who would take in the event of intestacy 
are IikPly to be familiar with the handwriting of the 
decedent and have ample opportunity to challenge 
prohate in a formal proceeding. Although it is only a 
minor deficiency, the requirement that the witnesses 
who prove the authenticity of the handwriting be 
"disinterested" should be eliminated. 
Legislati ve propo::;al l:~ implement.s these recom-
mendation::; by amending § 64.1-49 a nd is ::;et forth in 
the Appendix. 
M. Self-Proved Will; Out-of-State 
Notarial Certificates 
Virginia, by § 64.1-H7.1, provides a mechanism 
whereby a will may be made self-proved, that is, 
admitted to prohate without further proof of due exe-
cution. The required procedure entails the testator 
and the witnes::;e::; appearing before an officer author-
ized to administer oath::; under the law::; of Virginia 
and each signing a declaration on a prescribed form . 
Bya 1983 amendment, an a lternate method involving 
acknowledgment under oath is provided by ~ 64.1-
87.2. The Virginia statutes differ from the U.P.C. 
counterpart, ~ 2-fi04, in that the latter gives effect to 
out·of-state notarial certificates while the former do 
not. 
Virginia's various statutes with respect to out-of-
state notarial acts are not consistent. By rea::;on of a 
19HO amendment, ~ 64.1-92 provide::; that an authenti-
cated copy of any will which has heen selfproved 
under the laws of another state shall, when offered 
with its authenticated certificate of probate, be admit-
ted to probate as a will of personalty and real estate. 
Thu::;, a self-proving will with an out-of-::;tate notarial 
certificate, if probated el::;ewhere. can be probated in 
Virginia with relative ease. The restrictions on out-of-
state notarial certificates found in §§ 64.1-H7.1 and 
64.1-R7.2 are also inconsistent with the Virginia ver-
sion of the Uniform Recognition of Acknowledge-
ments Act, which, at ~ 5.5-11R.l provides: "Notarial 
acts may be performed outside this state for use in 
this state with the same effect as if performed by a 
notary of this state." 
Because of the remoteness of the possibility of fraud 
and the ,- 'Jai lability Ii o}Jportunities under' Virginia 
law to contest the validity of will::; by formal proceed-
ings, the limiting of ~§ 64.1-87.1 and f:i4.1-H7.2 to only 
wills that have been acknowledged before Virginia 
officials is unwarranted and unduly restrictive. 
Amendments are proposed to ~~ 64 .1-1-\7.1 and 64.1-
H7.2 and are set forth in the Appendix as Ipgislative 
proposals 14 and 15. 
Conclusion 
The proposals discussed in this ariticle address per-
ceived inadequacies in Virginia's wills statutes. They 
are intended to facilitate the devolution of property in 
a manner that more closely implements the intent of 
testators, correct unintended conseq uences flowing 
from recent amendments to the intestacy statutes, 
remove unnecessary constraints on testation, elimi-
nate ambiguities in existing Jaw and accommodate 
more fully the testator who, having formulated and 
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executed his estate plan in another state, acqUlres 
property or becomes domiciled in Virginia. 
APPENDIX 
Note: Proposals 1, 2, 3, and 4 were presented in the 
Spring, 19R:1 issue of the Virginia Bar Journal. They 
involve amendments to § 64.1-64, § 64.1-65, S 64.1-58 
and § 64.1-60. 
Proposal 5. It is proposed that new § 64.1-69.1 be 
enacted to read as follows : 
§ 64.1-69.1 When omitted spouse to take intestate 
portion.-If a testator fails to provide for a surviving 
spouse who married the testator after the execution of 
the will, the omitted spouse shall receive the same 
share of the estate such spouse would have received if 
the decedent left no will, unless it appears from the 
will that the omission was intentional. 
Proposal 6. It is proposed that § 64.1-59 be amended 
and reenacted to read as follows: 
§ 64.1-59. Revocation by divorce; no revocation by 
other changes in circumstances.-If, after making a 
will, the testator is divorced a vinculo matrimonii or 
his marriage is annulled, the divorce or annulment 
revokes any disposition or appointment of property 
made by the will to the former spouse, any provision 
conferring a general or special power of appointment 
on the former spouse and any nomination of the 
former spouse as executor, trustee, conservator or 
guardian, unless the will expressly provides other-
wise. Property pre\ ·,ted from passing to a former 
spouse because of revocation by divorce or annulment 
passes as if the former spouse fai· :I to survive the 
testator, and other provisions conferring some power 
or office on the former spouse are interpreted as if the 
spouse failed to survive the testator. If provisions are 
revoked solely by this section, they are revived by the 
testator's remarriage to the former spouse. No change 
of circumstances other than as described in this sec-
tion revokes a will. 
Proposal 7. It is proposed that new § 64.1-62.2 be 
enacted to read as follows: 
§ 64.1-62.2. Specific devise or bequest; burden of 
secured dehts.-Unless a contrary intention shall 
appear by the will, a devise or bequest of realty or of 
tangible personalty shall pass to the devisee or lega-
tee subject to any mortgage existing at the date of 
death, without right of exoneration, and notwith-
standing a general direction in the will to pay debts. 
As used herein "mortgage" means deed of trust and 
any conveyance, agreement or arrangement in which 
property is used as security. Where any mortgaged 
realty or tangible personalty passes to two or more 
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persons, the interest of each such person shall, only 
as between such persons, bear its proportionate share 
of the debt secured. Where two or more such proper-
ties are mortgaged to secure a single indebtedness, 
each such property shall, only as between the recip-
ients thereof, bear its proportionate share of the 
indebtedness by reference to values at date of death. 
Proposal 8. It is proposed that § 64.1-67 be amended 
and reenacted to read as follows: 
§ 64.1-67. Exercise of power of appointment.-
Unless a contrary intention shall appear in the wiJI, a 
residuary clause in a will or a will making general 
disposition of all the testator's property does not exer-
cise a power of appointment held by the testator. 
Proposal 9. It is proposed that § 64.1-6:3 be amended 
and reenacted to read as follows: 
§ 64.1-63. When advancement deemed satisfaction 
of devise or bequest.-Property which a testator gave 
in his lifetime to a person is not treated as a satisfac-
tion of a devise or bequest to that person, in whole or 
in part, unless the will provides for deduction of the 
lifetime gift, or the testator declares in a contempo-
raneous writing that the gift is to be deducted from 
the devise or bequest or is in satisfaction thereof, or 
the devisee or legatee acknowledges in writing that 
the gift is in satisfaction. 
Proposal 10. It is proposed that new S 64.1-62.1 be 
enacted to read as follows: 
§ 64.1·62.1. How certain legacies and devise to he 
construed; nonademptiorr in certain cases.-Unless a 
contrary intention shall appear in the will: 
a) a bequest of specific securities whether or not 
expressed in number of shares shall include as much 
of the bequeathed securities as is part of the estate at 
time of the testator's death , any additional or other 
securities of the same entity owned by the testator by 
reason of action initiated by the entity, (but excluding 
any acquired by exercise of purchase options) and 
any securities of another entity acquired with respect 
to the specific securities mentioned in the bequest as a 
result of a merger, consolidation, reorganization or 
other similar action initiated by the entity; 
b) a bequest or devise of specific property shall 
include any amount of a condemnation award for the 
taking of the property unpaid at death and any pro· 
ceeds unpaid at death on fire and casualty insurance 
on the property. 
c) a devise or bequest of specific property shall, in 
addition to such property as is part of the estate of the 
testator, be deemed to be a legacy of a pecuniary 
amount if such specific property shall, during the 
life of the testator and while he is under a disability, 
be sold by a conservator, guardian, or committee for 
the testator, or by judicial sale, or if a condemnation 
award or proceeds of fire or casualty insurance as to 
such property are paid to such fiduciary. For this pur-
pose, the pecuniary amount shall be the net sale price, 
condemnation award or insurance proceeds, reduced 
by such sums received under subsection (b). This sub-
section shall not apply if, after the sale, condemna-
tion, or casualty, it is adjudicated that the disability 
of the testator has ceased and the testator survives 
the adjudication by one year. 
Proposal 11. It is proposed that § 64.1-73 (Devise or 
bequest to trustee of an established trust) be amended 
and reenacted to delete subsection (a)(3) and (h), 
which subsections pertain to non-resident trsutees. 
Proposal 12. It is proposed to amend and reenact 
§ 64.1-7:1 (Devise or bequest to trustee of an established 
trust) by adding new subsection (d)(3) to read as 
follows: 
§ 64.1-7,3(d)(3). Any interest in remainder under 
such trust as to property so devised or bequeathed 
and not otherwise conditioned on survival of the tes-
tator shall not be defeated by reason of the death of 
the remainderman prior to that of the testator. In such 
event, the interest in remainder shall pass as if the 
remainderman had survived the testator. 
Proposal 13. It is proposed that § 64.1·49 be 
amended and reenacted to read as follows: 
S 64.1-49. Will must be in writing, etc; mode of exe-
cution ; witnesses, and proof of hand writ in g.-No will 
shall be valid unless it be in writing and signed by the 
testator, or by some other person in his presence and 
by his direction, in such manner as to make it mani-
fest that the name is intended as a signature; and 
moreover, unless the material provisions thereof be in 
the handwriting of the testator, such will must be 
signed by at least two competent witnesses each of 
whom witnessed either the signing or the testator's 
acknowledgement of the signature or of the will. If the 
material provisions of the will be in the handwriting 
of the testator, that fact shall be proved by at least 
two competent witnesses. 
Proposal 14. It is proposed that § 64.1-R7.!. be 
amended and reenacted by revising the first and last 
paragraphs thereof to read as follows: 
§ 64.1-87.1. How will may be made self-proved .-A 
will, at the time of its execution or at any subsequent 
date, may be made self-proved by the acknowledge-
ment thereof by the testator and the affidavits of two 
or more attesting witnesses, each made before an 
officer authorized to administer oaths under the laws 
of this Commonwealth, or of the state where the 
acknowledgement occurred, and evidenced by the 
officer's certificate, attached or annexed to the wiII in 
form and content substantially as follows: ... (omit-
ted portions of statute) ... 
All certificates to wills made pursuant to this sec-
tion and executed by the officer before June 1, 1977 
shall be held, and the same are hereby declared valid 
and effective in all respects if otherwise in accordance 
with the provisions of this section, notwithstanding 
that such officer did not attach or affix his official 
seal thereto, and notwithstanding that the acknowl-
edgement was before an officer authorized to admin-
ister oaths under the laws of another state. Any 
codicil which is self-proved under the provisions of 
this section which also, by its terms, expressly con-
firms, ratifies and republishes a will except as altered 
by the codicil shall have the effect of self-proving the 
will whether or not the will was so executed origi-
nally. 
Proposal 15. It is proposed that S 64.1 -87.2 be 
amended and reenacted by revising the first para-
graph to read the same as the first paragraph III 
§ 64.1-87.1, set forth in Proposal 14 above. 
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